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The effect of income on general life satisfaction and
dissatisfaction
Abstract
Increasing evidence from the empirical economic and psychological literature suggests that positive and
negative well-being are more than opposite ends of the same phenomenon. Two separate measures of
the dependent variable may therefore be needed when analyzing the determinants of subjective
well-being. We investigate asymmetries in the effect of income on subjective well-being with a
single-item measure of general life satisfaction. Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel
1984-2004, and a flexible multiple-index ordered probit panel data model with varying thresholds, we
find that income has only a minor effect on high satisfaction but significantly reduces dissatisfaction.
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1 Introduction
Pinning down the income elasticity of subjective well-being is one of the great challenges in the
emerging field of the economics of happiness (Layard 2005, Frey and Stutzer 2002, Bruni and
Porta 2006). If this line of research is to have a lasting impact on economic policy making, a
reliable estimate, and understanding, of the effect of income on well-being (the extent to which
“money can buy happiness”) will be a litmus test. The recent survey by Clark et al. (2006) bears
witness to the intensive empirical economic research undertaken in this area.
The emotional model theory of subjective well-being, developed in the early 1980s by psychol-
ogist Ed Diener, posits that individuals’ appraisals of their own lives (i.e., a person’s individual
judgment about his current status in the world) capture the essence of well-being (Diener 1984,
Diener et al. 1985, Diener et al. 1999). The literature has identified three core components of
subjective well-being: positive affect, (the lack of) negative affect, and general life satisfaction
(i.e., subjective appreciation of life’s rewards), separable constructs that can be independently
examined. Together these three capture a broad range of hedonic and eudemonic experience.
An important early result, sometimes referred to as “well-being paradox”, is that average
satisfaction in a country does not increase as countries grow wealthier (Easterlin 1974, 1995).
At the individual level, there is a weak positive cross-sectional association between income and
satisfaction. If one follows an individual over the life-cycle however, as income first increases and
then levels off, subjective well-being remains unchanged. Income expectations and aspirations
matter, which means that the effect is subject to habituation and comparison (Diener and Biswas-
Diener 2002, Clark and Oswald 1996, Luttmer 2005). As expected, the estimated effects differ
somewhat depending on whether long-term or short-term income fluctuations are considered,
whether truly exogenous variation in income is available, how exactly subjective well-being is
measured, and what other controls are included in the model.
The contribution of our paper is to explore, for general life satisfaction (GLS), whether the
effect of income is different in different parts of the satisfaction distribution. Is it perhaps the case
that the effect of income differs for persons who are relatively dissatisfied, relative to those who
report a high life satisfaction, regardless of income? Such a finding would not only improve our
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understanding of the mechanism underlying the GLS responses, but also add another explanation
to why the overall effect is rather small although income may have a substantial effect for part of
the population. Any evaluation of the well-being consequences of economic policies would need
to account for such asymmetries.
We should briefly explain what we mean by “response asymmetries”. In the traditional inter-
pretation of the single item GLS scale, satisfaction is just the absence of dissatisfaction. In this
view, the effect of income on satisfaction is equal to minus the effect of income on dissatisfaction.
We avoid such a cardinal interpretation and rather focus on the ordering. For simplicity, consider
the case where the GLS scale has only three categories: “satisfied”, “neutral” and “dissatisfied”.1
The model we consider does not impose a priori that factors increasing the probability of satis-
faction must also reduce the probability of dissatisfaction, and vice versa. This is new, as far as
we can tell, although there have been a number of related approaches.
Huppert and Whittington (2003) use the General Health Questionnaire (GHQ-30) to identify
positive items. The score on these positive items is then labeled “positive well-being”, whereas a
standard symptom measure of psychological distress, also from the GHQ-30, is used for “negative
well-being”. Similarly, Headey and Wooden (2004) compare well-being from a GLS question (as
used in our paper) with ill-being obtained from a five-item scale on mental health (i.e., capturing
anxiety, depression, and the like). These studies therefore do not investigate differences in the
effects of a variable, such as income, at different poles of the same scale. Our approach also
differs from the large literature on positive and negative affect, spurred by Bradburn (1969), since
we focus on global life satisfaction, a person’s conscious evaluative judgment of life, rather than
affect.
With data from the German Socio-Economic Panel 1984-2004, we find that income significantly
reduces the incidence of low satisfaction but it does not increase the incidence of high satisfaction in
a subsample of men living in one-person households. This finding corroborates previous evidence
of asymmetric effects from multi-item analyses of subjective well-being, this time with a single-
item measure of general life satisfaction.
1The question we actually use is a response to “How satisfied are you with your life, all things considered?” on an
11-point numerical scale, where “0” is labeled “completely dissatisfied” and “10” is labeled “completely satisfied”.
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2 Happiness and Income in Economics
For economists, empirical evidence on the relationship between income and subjective well-being
(SWB) is important for (at least) two reasons. First, the design and evaluation of economic policies
often takes income as the target quantity of interest. The idea is, of course, that income is a good
proxy for well-being, and that it is easy to measure. If the link between income and well-being is
less strong than suspected, then economic policies based on income (or GDP) maximization alone
may turn out to be inferior from an overall well-being perspective.
Second, the relationship between income and well-being may be used to put a monetary value
— or shadow price — on non-traded goods, usually in the context of cost-benefit analyses. The
basic idea is one of compensation: in case of a “bad”, how much of an increase in income is
required to offset the negative effect of the bad, while keeping the person at the same level of
SWB as in the absence of the bad? Similarly, in case of a good, one can implicitly determine the
shadow price by asking how much income a person would be willing to give up in order to obtain
the good, keeping SWB fixed.
Examples for this line of research are Blanchflower and Oswald (2004), who estimate the
pecuniary value of a lasting marriage (relative to widowhood) to be $100,000 per year. Other
examples include Winkelmann and Winkelmann (1998) who estimate the money-equivalent value
of the psychological cost of unemployment, a trade-off that we will come back to below, and
Schwarze (2003) who uses the principle to determine an income equivalence scale, i.e., the income
compensation required to keep the same level of an individual’s well-being with one additional
household member present. Frey et al. (2004) estimate the value of public safety, or the absence
of terrorism. Van Praag and Baarsma (2005) measure the external cost of air traffic noise for
people living near the Amsterdam Airport.
Unfortunately, the implied compensation may be sensitive to the chosen model, and too re-
strictive assumptions may lead to spurious estimates. An obvious concern is that the same income
change has a different meaning for poor than for rich people. This concern resonates throughout
the literature. Typically, it is found that the correlation between income and subjective well-being
is much stronger among the poor. While the absence of poverty does not guarantee happiness,
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the presence often prevents it (Diener and Biswas-Diener 2002). Such non-linearities can be ad-
dressed, for instance, by studying the correlation between GLS and logarithmic income. In this
case, a proportionate effect is assumed: To achieve the same increase in satisfaction, larger and
larger absolute changes in income are necessary. Semi-parametric estimators have provided some
support for a log-linear functional form.
The topic of our paper is different. Not all poor people are dissatisfied with their lives, nor are
all wealthy people satisfied. The general life satisfaction scale integrates the subjects’ reflected
valuation of various domains of their lives, weighting them in whatever way they choose (van Praag
et al. 2003). In the broadest sense, one can distinguish two domains, a pecuniary domain and a
non-pecuniary domain (that includes, perhaps most importantly, health and social relationships).
Our working hypothesis is that the non-pecuniary domain moderates the effect of the pecuniary
domain on GLS. Specifically, if the valuation of the non-pecuniary domain contributes to a low
GLS, then the effect of the pecuniary domain becomes stronger, i.e., an income increase will have
a more favorable effect on GLS, compared to the case where the non-pecuniary domain leads to a
high GLS score. Such a framework will lead to the aforementioned response asymmetries: income
will lower dissatisfaction more than it will increase satisfaction.
To test this hypothesis, we cannot use conventional regression or ordered response models,
because in these models the effect of income at various satisfaction levels cannot be estimated
freely but rather is dictated by functional form, essentially a single parameter. A naive approach
would be to split the scale, for example by defining the outcomes “dissatisfied” for scores below
an arbitrary cut-off, and “satisfied” for values above an arbitrary cut-off, and analyzing their
response patterns separately. Slightly more sophisticated approaches can be based either on a
latent class framework, or on generalized ordered probit models as proposed here.
In latent class models, one can define any number of latent groups and estimate the effect of
income conditional on group membership. A recent example for such an approach is the study by
Clark et al. (2005) who used GLS data from the European Community Household Panel. They
found that the effect of income changes were larger in the “latent satisfied” than in the “latent
dissatisfied” classes. Here we address the issue from a different angle: Rather than inferring
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response asymmetries from unobservable class membership, we model them directly using an
alternative approach with outcome-specific parameters, a generalized ordered probit model for
panel data. The technical details of the model are discussed in the next section.
3 Econometric Modeling
Most empirical work on the determinants of subjective well-being uses either linear regression or
single-index ordered probit and logit models. While the latter account for the discreteness and
ordering of the dependent variable, they impose an implicit cardinalization such that, for example,
the trade-off ratios between income and other determinants of well-being must be constant across
the distribution of outcomes (Boes and Winkelmann 2006). Since we want to estimate unrestricted
income effects for low and high levels of well-being, we need to use more flexible models, and the
multinomial logit with its multi-index structure is certainly one option. However, this model
does not make any use of the ordering information and therefore cannot be efficient. We propose
a generalization of Maddala’s (1983) and Terza’s (1985) model to panel data instead that is
comparably flexible as the multinomial logit and in addition accounts for the ordinality.
Model and Assumptions
Let Yit ∈ {1, . . . , J} denote the survey response to the GLS question of individual i = 1, . . . , n
at time t = 1, . . . , Ti, and let Xit denote the vector of covariates (including logarithmic income).
The relationship between Yit and Xit is specified in terms of cumulative conditional probabilities:
P (Yit ≤ y|Xit; θy) = Φ(−X ′itθy) y = 1, . . . , J − 1 (1)
where Φ(·) denotes the cumulative density of the standard normal distribution, and θy denotes a
vector of category-specific parameters, including a constant.2 The function Φ(·) maps the linear
index onto the unit interval, and we require θ = (θ1 . . . θJ−1) to fulfill the strict inequalities
X ′itθ1 > . . . > X
′
itθJ−1 such that the cumulative probabilities increase with each increment in
2For the ease of exposition, we set up the model in terms of cumulative conditional probabilities. Like the
standard ordered probit, the generalized model may also be motivated in terms of a latent variable and a threshold
crossing mechanism generating the ordinal response variable. We refer to Winkelmann and Boes (2006: Ch. 6) for
a detailed outline of the underlying assumptions and identification issues in this framework.
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y. Due to adding up P (Yit ≤ J |Xit) = 1, so that we can only identify J − 1 category-specific
parameter vectors. The model reduces to the standard ordered probit model if only the constant
term in θy is category-specific.
In order to exploit the advantages of panel data more fully, the model can be augmented by
individual specific time invariant effects. Conditioning on such effects avoids bias if, for exam-
ple, unobserved personality traits affect well-being as well as observable characteristics (Ferrer-i-
Carbonell and Frijters 2004). Let ηi denote such individual effects, and rewrite the cumulative
probabilities (1) conditional on ηi as
P (Yit ≤ y|Xit, ηi; θy) = Φ(−X ′itθy − ηi) y = 1, . . . , J − 1 (2)
We assume that Xit is strictly exogenous conditional on ηi and that outcomes are independent
conditional on (Xi, ηi), where Xi contains Xit for all t. The first assumption rules out lagged
dependent variables in Xit, the second assumption allows for dependencies in Yit across t if
conditioned only on Xi. Note that the independence assumption restricts the covariance matrix
of individual effects to be diagonal, i.e., Cov(ηi, ηi′) = 0 ∀i 6= i′.
Without specifying the relationship between Xit and ηi, i.e., treating ηi as fixed parameters
to be estimated along with θ, a model based on (2) will suffer from the incidental parameters
problem. For fixed time and large cross-sectional dimension, the number of parameters ηi is
unbounded, with available information on ηi being fixed, which in general yields inconsistent
estimators of ηi and θ. We solve this problem by treating ηi as random variable drawn along
with (Xi, Yi) and following the idea of Chamberlain (1980) under a Mundlak (1978) restriction to
allow for possible correlation between ηi and Xi:
ηi = X¯ ′iγ + αi (3)
where X¯i is the vector of averages of Xit over time, γ is a conformable parameter vector, and
αi is an orthogonal error with αi|Xi ∼ Normal(0, σ2α).3 The distributional assumption and the
independence ensure that the correlation matrix of the random effects is the identity matrix. If
3A straightforward generalization of (3) would be to let γ vary by the satisfaction levels, i.e., replace γ by
γy. Computationally somewhat more involved would be to let αi vary by the satisfaction level. Note that only
time-varying covariates are included in X¯i because otherwise θy and γ would not be separately identified.
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we replace ηi in (2) by (3), then we obtain
P (Yit ≤ y|Xit, X¯i, αi; θy, γ) = Φ(−X ′itθy − X¯ ′iγ − αi) y = 1, . . . , J − 1 (4)
or in terms of a conditional probability model for all y = 1, . . . , J
P (Yit = y|Xit, X¯i, αi; θ, γ) = Φ(−X ′itθy − X¯ ′iγ − αi)− Φ(−X ′itθy−1 − X¯ ′iγ − αi) (5)
where it is understood that Φ(−X ′itθ0 − X¯ ′iγ − αi) = 0 and Φ(−X ′itθJ − X¯ ′iγ − αi) = 1 due
to identification and adding up to one.4 The joint distribution of (Yi1, . . . , YiTi) conditional on
observables is obtained by integrating out αi in the probabilities (5),
f(yi1, . . . , yiTi |xi; θ, γ, σα)
=
∫ ∞
−∞
Ti∏
t=1
J∏
y=1
P (yit = y|xit, x¯i, αi; θ, γ)1(yit=y) 1
σα
φ
(
αi
σα
)
dαi (6)
with indicator function 1(·), and yit, xit, x¯i denote sample realizations of Yit, Xit, X¯i. The inner
product over all J categories selects the appropriate likelihood contribution for each observation
(individual i at time t) according to the observed category, and the independence of Yit conditional
on (Xi, αi) ensures that the joint probability of (Yi1, . . . , YiJ)|(Xi, αi) can be written as the product
of single probabilities over Ti. The integral in (6) does not have a closed form solution, but it can
be rewritten in a form amenable to Gauss-Hermite quadrature for numerical approximation.
Estimation of parameters by maximum likelihood is straightforward once the integral has
been evaluated, and the resulting estimator is consistent, efficient, and approximately normally
distributed. The generalized ordered probit model with random effects specification has been
implemented in a new Stata module called regoprob available via the ssc commands in Stata.5
Type net search regoprob or ssc install regoprob in the command line of Stata to find
out more about regoprob. See also the documentation of regoprob for details on the command
syntax and the output generated by Stata.
4This can be achieved, for example, by setting all slope parameters in θ0 and θJ to zero, and letting the constant
term in θ0 go to minus infinity and the constant term in θJ to plus infinity.
5Stata is a registered trademark of StataCorp, College Station TX, USA.
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Interpretation of the Model
There are a number of ways to interpret the estimated parameters, but we focus here on two
quantities that offer a very intuitive interpretation when dealing with conditional probability
models. First, we may ask the question “How does a ceteris paribus change in income affect the
distribution of GLS responses?” which can be answered by marginal probability effects (MPE’s).
Such effects are of particular interest for the asymmetry hypothesis since we are able to identify
whether income effects on GLS differ for low and high GLS. Second, we may look at asymmetric
effects from a different (probability) angle insofar as we do not investigate the change in the GLS
distribution at different poles, but instead we keep the GLS distribution fixed and analyze income
changes required to compensate for a change in another covariate, thereby distinguishing between
trade-offs for low and and high GLS.
MPE’s can be obtained by taking first derivatives of (5) with respect to the variable(s) of
interest. Since αi is an unobserved random variable, we cannot directly calculate the MPE’s
without further assumptions. One possibility would be to take advantage of the probit form and
the normality of αi and rewrite the conditional probabilities marginal on αi as
P (Yit = y|Xit, X¯i; θ, γ, σα) = Φ
(
−X ′itθy − X¯ ′iγ√
1 + σ2α
)
− Φ
(
−X ′itθy−1 − X¯ ′iγ√
1 + σ2α
)
= Φ
(−X ′itϑy − X¯ ′iψ)− Φ (−X ′itϑy−1 − X¯ ′iψ) (7)
where ϑy = θy(1 + σ2α)
−1/2 and ψ = γ(1 + σ2α)−1/2 denote the population-averaged coefficient
vectors. The coefficients are called population-averaged since they are obtained as the expectation
of (5) over αi. Taking derivatives of (7) yields
MPE(l)y =
∂P (Yit = y|Xit, X¯i;ϑ, ψ)
∂X
(l)
it
= φ(−X ′itϑy−1 − X¯ ′iψ)ϑ(l)y−1 − φ(−X ′itϑy − X¯ ′iψ)ϑ(l)y (8)
where φ(·) denotes the density function of the standard normal distribution, and X(l)it denotes
the l-th element in Xit (here assumed to be logarithmic income) and ϑ
(l)
y the corresponding
scaled (income) coefficient. The MPE’s are functions of the covariates and therefore depend on
the values of Xit and X¯i. We estimate the MPE’s replacing the unknown coefficients by the
maximum likelihood estimates and evaluating at the sample averages of the regressors.
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The second quantity of interest, the trade-off ratio, assesses the importance of income relative
to other determinants. It follows from totally differentiating (7) that
dP (Yit = y|Xit, X¯i;ϑ, ψ) =MPE(l)y dX(l)it +MPE(m)y dX(m)it (9)
where X(l)it denotes logarithmic income, X
(m)
it denotes any other covariate in Xit, and the MPE’s
are given by (8). The approximation in (9) directly leads to the concept of compensating variation:
How much of a variation in one regressor (here income) is needed to offset the given change
in another regressor such that dP (Yit = y|Xit, X¯i;ϑ, ψ) = 0 ∀y, i.e., all probabilities remain
unchanged. Rearranging terms yields
dX
(l)
it
dX
(m)
it
= −MPE
(m)
y
MPE
(l)
y
(10)
In the standard model, this trade-off ratio reduces to the ratio of coefficients, i.e., we obtain
dX
(l)
it /dX
(m)
it = ϑ
(m)/ϑ(l), which does not vary across outcomes, whereas in the generalized model
such an restriction is not imposed. Rather, we can let the data speak and determine empirically
how these trade-off ratios look like.
4 Data
The German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) is a large annual panel survey of randomly selected
households in Germany (see Burkhauser et al. 2001 for more details). Personal information is
available for all household members aged 16 and above. Our data are drawn from the West
German (A) subsample 1984-2004, yielding a maximum of 21 observations per individual (on
average about five observations per individual). We apply a number of standard selection criteria:
included individuals are between 25 and 65 years old at the time of the survey, and we require
non-missing information on all the included variables.6
In addition, we employ a novel restriction by considering single person households only. The
rationale for this selection is that the match between reported household income and individual
material well-being is much better in single-person households than we could possibly hope for
6The variables we include in the model generally have very high response rates with missing information for only
a few respondents, in particular for the GLS variable, so that we do not expect significant bias in the results from
dropping these observations.
9
in a multi-person household. General household surveys such as the GSOEP typically include
two types of income measures, one being total household income (from all sources), the other
being personal labor earnings. Clearly, personal labor earnings are not a very good indicator of
material well-being, in particular, but not only, for persons who do not work, as it does not include
any government transfers (e.g., child benefit, government grants, or rent subsidies). Household
income (net of taxes and social security contributions) is in general a more appropriate measure.
However, in multi-person households, there remain two types of ambiguities. First, there is an
ongoing debate on the right equivalence scale in order to reflect economies of scale in household
production and consumption. Secondly, we do not know whether resources are shared evenly
within the household, but such an (arbitrary) assumption is required when assigning one income
to several household members.
For these reasons, we find it instructive to study the relationship between income and SWB
in the (reference) population of single person households. We do not claim that such a sample is
representative for the whole population, and of course, this raises the question of external validity:
To what extent can results for single person households be extrapolated to the population of all
households? While single person households are non-representative with respect to a number of
factors (such as age, and possibly also income), we controlled for this in our analysis, and it is a
priori unclear why the well-being function (after including these factors) should be different for
such persons.
All in all, this approach leaves us with 5007 person-year observations for men, and with 4727
person-year observations for women. The dependent variable is, as mentioned before, the response
to the survey question “How satisfied are you with your life, all things considered?”. There are
relatively few responses in the 0-2 range. For this reason, and to preserve some degrees of freedom
(a full set of regression parameters is added for each additional category), we use a modified scale
where the original 0-2 responses have been grouped into the lowest “dissatisfied” category.
Figure 1 depicts the frequency distribution of GLS responses in our sample, separately for men
and women. People are mostly satisfied with their life: about two thirds report a GLS level of
seven or higher, and women have a slightly higher average GLS level than men. The distribution
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in Figure 1 is characteristic of most SWB distributions in the sense that the majority of people
reports a relatively high level of GLS, although the highest response category is chosen relatively
infrequently.
— Insert Figure 1 about here —
In the regression analysis, control variables include — apart from logarithmic income — a
second order polynomial in age and dummy variables for unemployment and health status. Of
course, household status and gender is controlled for as well by the way the sample is set up and
the analysis is performed. We use a relatively simple specification with only a few variables. This
has two main advantages. First, since eight regression parameters are estimated for each variable,
fewer regressors keep the model manageable. Second, many of the additional variables used in
the previous literature are arguably endogenous choice variables, obstructing the interpretation
of the results.
Table 1 summarizes the sample means of the explanatory variables by gender. Among one-
person households, men have a significantly higher monthly income than women (about 260 Euros)
and are on average more than five years younger. The unemployment rate is about 2.5 percentage
points higher for men than for women, and 58.2 percent of the women are relatively satisfied
with their health status (compared to 65.6 percent of the men). These variations can largely be
explained by the different age distributions of single male and single female households. Men are
mostly living alone when they are young and at the beginning of their career path. Women are
more likely to live alone when they are older, contributing factors being a higher incidence of
widowhood due to greater life-expectancy.
— Insert Table 1 about here —
Table 2 cross-tabulates the sample means of the dependent variable conditional on the GLS
response, again separately for men and women. The income variable shows a lot of variation
along the GLS dimension. For men (panel A), the lowest average monthly income (1124 Euro)
is observed for individuals with very low GLS, the highest income (1519 Euro) for those with
response “8”. When moving from the utmost left part of the GLS distribution to the right,
11
average income is first increasing then decreasing. A similar pattern can be observed for women
(panel B), although on a lower level. Concerning unemployment and health, we find that among
less satisfied people the unemployment rate is relatively high and that reported health status and
GLS are positively correlated.
— Insert Table 2 about here —
5 Estimation Results
In this section, we report on the estimation results of the relationship between income and sub-
jective well-being, the latter measured by general life satisfaction. We first present the estimated
income parameters under several model assumptions, then turn our attention to the implications
with respect to the asymmetry hypothesis, and finally discuss the robustness of our results.
We estimated two different models: A random effects ordered probit model (OProbit) including
group means as additional regressors, and a generalized random effects ordered probit model
(GOProbit), also including group means, where all parameters are outcome-specific. In both
cases, the pooled models were clearly rejected against the panel models, which is reflected in
Table 3 where we report the estimated variances (and standard errors) of the random effects,
σˆ2α, separately for men and women. Furthermore, a joint significance test of the group means as
additional regressors rejected the null hypothesis of zero correlation, and thus a simple random
effects specification without X¯i is rejected by the data.
— Insert Table 3 about here —
In our analysis, we will not only examine the relationship between income and GLS, but we
will also consider the interaction with unemployment in order to evaluate the relative impact of
income. Table 4 displays the estimated coefficients on logarithmic income and unemployment
separately for men (panel A) and women (panel B). Although the raw parameters are not very
interesting per se, the comparison may be useful for understanding our later results. For men,
we find a positive and significant income parameter in the standard model (0.362 with z-value
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6.67). In the generalized model, eight different parameters are estimated. The income coefficients
are slightly higher for the parameter vectors θ1 to θ6 than the overall estimate in the standard
model. The point estimate decreases but is still significant for θ7, and finally turns negative and
insignificant for θ8. The estimated coefficients in the sample of women are smaller (in absolute
value) and less significant than those for men indicating a weaker relative impact. For example, in
the standard model we obtain an income point estimate of 0.131, which is only about a third of that
for men, and the z-value decreases to 1.97. In the generalized model the income coefficients are
significant on the 5%-level only for θ4 and θ5, while all other income coefficients are insignificant.
For the unemployment coefficient in the subsample of men we obtain point estimates for low/high
satisfaction that are smaller/higher (in absolute terms) than the overall estimate in the standard
model, for women we observe the opposite pattern.
— Insert Table 4 about here —
If we formally test the generalized ordered probit model against the standard model, we can
reject the null hypothesis of equal slope parameters for men (LR203 = 548.9) and for women
(LR203 = 430.1). The null hypothesis of equal income coefficients is also rejected for both, men
and women, equal unemployment coefficients is only rejected for women.
In order to interpret the estimated parameters and evaluate the effects of income on low and
high GLS we now turn the quantities introduced in Section 3. Consider the marginal probabilities
first. Table 5, Figures 2 and 3 summarize the MPE’s of income and unemployment by gender.
Consider, for example, the results for men and take the ceteris paribus effect of an increase in
logarithmic household income by a small amount on the probability of responding a GLS level
of “8” (equal interpretation applies to the effects at all other GLS levels). Table 5 shows a
value of 0.059 for the standard model. This means that the probability of a response of “8”
increases by 0.059 percentage points if we increase logarithmic income by 0.01, which corresponds
approximately to a one-percent increase in level income. A doubling of income, i.e., a change in
logarithmic income by 0.693, increases the probability of response “8” by about 0.059×0.693×100,
or about 4.09 percentage points, ceteris paribus.
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— Insert Table 5, Figures 2 and 3 about here —
Comparing the MPE’s among the standard and the generalized models and over all possible
outcomes, we obtain the following pattern. For men all models suggest that more income sig-
nificantly reduces the probability of low GLS (0-5), and significantly increases the probability of
response “8”. For high GLS responses (9-10), the standard model predicts a significant positive
effect, whereas the generalized model does not predict an effect significantly different from zero.
Thus, based on the generalized ordered probit model, there is no evidence for income to have an
effect on high satisfaction. Moreover, the effect of income is asymmetric: higher income decreases
the probability of dissatisfaction, but it does not affect the probability of high satisfaction. Figure
2 illustrates the asymmetric effects and shows the differences between the MPE’s in the standard
ordererd probit model and the generalized ordered probit model.
For women the relationship between income and GLS is relatively weak. While the standard
model finds small but significant effects for low and high GLS, the generalized model predicts
a significant negative effect only for responses “5” and “6”. Concerning unemployment, we find
evidence for men that an increased unemployment probability reduces the probability of response
“8”, or higher, and increases the probability of low responses, but the relationship for women is
less clear. For example, an increase in the probability of being unemployed by one percentage
point reduces the probability of response “8” by about 0.096 percentage points for men, and raises
the probability of the same outcome by about 0.051 percentage points for women. The gender
difference might be explained by social norms that assign the role of primary income earner
to men and therefore make income a relatively more important determinant of male well-being
(e.g., Lalive and Stutzer 2004). Such a gender difference can also be observed when considering
unemployment.
The relationship between GLS, income, and unemployment, for men and women, at various
parts of the GLS distribution can alternatively be illustrated by the trade-off ratios. Table 6,
Figures 4 and 5 show the required changes in logarithmic income if the unemployment probability
increases by one percentage point, given the GLS distribution is fixed. If we want to interpret the
reported numbers, we need to be careful with respect to the significance of MPE’s. The trade-off
14
ratio does only make sense for significant income effects. In this case, the required change in
income is either zero if the MPE of unemployment is statistically not different from zero, or the
change is positive (or negative) for significant unemployment effects. We marked the four cases
(non-sensible/zero/positive/negative) with ×/ ◦ /+ /−.
— Insert Table 6, Figures 4 and 5 about here —
The numbers in Table 6 (multiplied by 100) approximate the percentage change in income,
e.g., for men in the standard model a 0.019 means that income must increase by 1.9 percent to
offset the increase in the unemployment probability by one percentage point. As expected, the
trade-off ratios in the ordered probit model are constant for all levels of GLS, and interpretation
therefore is not particularly interesting. In the generalized model, required income changes vary
between 0.6 and 4.2 percent. An important observation is that income compensations are entirely
ineffective for men with high GLS, and effective for medium to low satisfied men, though in a very
heterogeneous way. For women, a compensation for unemployment in terms of income is rather
unpromising, and other factors determining GLS need to be identified when looking for effective
compensation schemes. Figures 4 and 5 provide a graphical illustration of the results.
While these results are obtained for a specific sample and a specific parametric model with
its set of assumptions, we found a remarkable robustness of the main conclusions with respect
to alternative specifications and samples. Possible alternatives include the use of different link
functions (rather than the probit ones), including the logit, the log-logistic, and the complemen-
tary log-log; we estimated a series of binary models, where the dependent variables result from
dichotomization of GLS responses, i.e., Yit > 2 against Yit ≤ 2, Yit > 3 against Yit ≤ 3, and so
on; conditioning on fixed effects using Chamberlain’s (1982) conditional logit model; the use of
multi-person household samples; and possible endogeneity of income in the GLS equation. We
could not find evidence for endogeneity. Neither provided alternative link functions a better fit,
nor did the response asymmetry for men disappear in multi-person households or with the full
set of responses.
15
6 Conclusion
The distinction between positive and negative well-being has been made for some time now.
Huppert and Whittington (2003) point out that the determinants of positive and negative well-
being are not necessarily the same. For example, in their study of participants in the British
Health and Lifestyle Survey, paid employment was found to be an important determinant of
positive well-being but to have less influence on psychological symptoms. Headey and Wooden
(2004) use also two separate measures of well-being and ill-being. In their case, the pecuniary
situation, captured through income and wealth, was found to affect both aspects equally.
Our paper takes a different approach. We also study the determinants of well-being, in partic-
ular the effect of income. However, we use a single item scale of general life satisfaction, where low
scores are interpreted as a state of “dissatisfaction” and high scores signify “satisfaction”. There
are a number of advantages of such a single measure. It is widely available, and it allows for a
straightforward computation of compensating income variations, an important application of this
type of modeling in economics. We therefore propose a new and very flexible panel data model
in which we can analyze whether income effects depend on the level of satisfaction. The model
allows for individual specific effects and outcome-specific parameters, i.e., the effect of income on
GLS may be non-monotonic.
In a sample of men in single-person households drawn from the German Socio-Economic Panel
waves 1984 to 2004, we find support for the existence of asymmetric income effects. Based on
our results, income has a large effect among men with low GLS responses, but no effect on men
with high GLS responses. For women in single-person households income plays a minor role in
the formation of GLS, and support of the asymmetry hypothesis is rather weak.
Clearly, more research is needed in this area. We think that our methodological focus on
flexible estimation of marginal probability effects and trade-off ratios with a single measure of
well-being, namely general life satisfaction, should prove useful in further investigations. If one
wants to estimate marginal probability effects and compensating variations in a meaningful way,
then one should use the generalized ordered probit model rather than the simpler models prevailing
in earlier research.
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Figure 1: Marginal Distribution of Satisfaction Responses
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Figure 2: Marginal Probability Effects of Income — Men
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Figure 3: Marginal Probability Effects of Income — Women
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Figure 4: Compensating Variation in Income — Men
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Figure 5: Compensating Variation in Income — Women
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics by Gender
Men Women
Variable Mean Std.Err. Mean Std.Err.
Monthly income in EUR 1403.5 12.0 1140.9 10.3
Age in years 40.24 0.16 45.80 0.20
Unemployment (0/1) 0.083 0.004 0.058 0.003
Good health (0/1) 0.656 0.007 0.582 0.007
Number of Obs. 5008 4727
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Table 3: Estimated Variances of the Random Effects by Gender and Model
OProbit GOProbit
Men 0.785 0.833
(0.184) (0.212)
Women 0.666 0.708
(0.150) (0.164)
Notes: The models are the ordered probit (OProbit) and
the generalized ordered probit (GOProbit). Estimated
standard errors in parentheses.
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